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INTRODUCTION
On June 28, 2012, the Supreme Court of the United
States issued its decision in National Federation of
Independent Business (“NFIB”) v. Sebelius, perhaps better
known as the Affordable Care Act (ACA) opinion. 1 Chief
Justice Roberts authored the Court’s 5-4 decision, sustaining
the ACA in its entirety save one exception. 2 The Court ruled
that Congress did not have the power to revoke a state’s
existing Medicaid funding as a penalty for that state refusing
to participate in the ACA’s Medicaid expansion provisions. 3
Chief Justice Roberts agreed with the dissenting Justices’
conclusion that the individual mandate to purchase health
insurance exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause power. 4
And although many Court-watchers anticipated that such a
finding would ring the death knell for the constitutionality of
the entire ACA, the Chief’s willingness to characterize the
individual mandate as a tax rather than a penalty for
purposes of determining its constitutionality allowed the
Court to hold that the mandate was a constitutional exercise
of Congress’s power to tax. 5
With respect to the ACA’s other hotly contested
provision—the requirement that States expand their
Medicaid coverage to continue receiving Medicaid funding—
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion determined that Congress had
gone too far. 6 The Medicaid expansion provision operated like
a “gun to the head” of the states, and coercion on such a level
Nevertheless, Chief Justice
violates the Constitution. 7
Roberts, joined by four other justices, held that the Court
could and must sever the Medicaid expansion provision from
the Act, to leave the remainder in place as valid law. 8
1. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
2. Id. at 2608.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 2598 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“Congress shall have
Power . . . [t]o regulate [c]ommerce . . . among the several States . . . .”)).
5. See id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“Congress shall have [p]ower
[t]o lay and collect taxes . . . .”)).
6. Id. at 2633–40 (Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Breyer and
Kagan, concluded that the Medicaid expansion was constitutionally
impermissible because the expansion permitted revocation of a State’s existing
Medicaid funding if they declined to comply with the expansion.).
7. See id. at 2604–05.
8. Id. at 2638–42 (Roberts, C.J., for the Court, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer,
Sotomayor, & Kagan, JJ.).
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The ACA plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions
are full of history lessons, health care statistics, insurance
argot, economic theories, and metaphors ranging from the
bellicose to the agricultural. However, the ACA decision is
not about cost-shifting, or healthcare services or the
healthcare market, or even about broccoli. 9 It is about power.
Specifically, it is about the protean allocation of decisionmaking power that gives life to American constitutional
federalism and the dualistic tension between the Federal
Government and the individual states.
There are two dominant federalism narratives, one
grounded in sovereignty, the other in cooperation. 10
Sovereignty federalism posits that state autonomy is
inviolable. 11 Advocates of this narrative argue that the
success of federalism depends on strict adherence to the idea
that the federal and state governments occupy separate
regulatory spheres. 12 By contrast, cooperative federalism 13
emphasizes integration over autonomy. 14 Supporters of this
narrative cast the states in a passive role as compliant
implementers of federal policy. 15 Recent scholarship has
explored more nuanced versions of cooperative federalism,
arguing that states, though subordinate in this
“master/servant” construction, can exploit their servant role
9. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.
v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 866 (2012) (No.11-398).
10. More recently, scholars have initiated a conversation about a third
theory of federalism known as “dynamic” federalism. This scholarship
focuses on the mechanisms that states can access to negotiate regulatory
implementation and protect themselves from national breaches of state
sovereignty. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L.
REV. 863 (2006); Kirsten Engle, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism
in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 176 (2006) (Dynamic federalism is
“the recognition and even celebration, of real-world overlap and dynamic
relationship between the state and federal authority.”); J.B. Ruhl & James
Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the
Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59 (2010).
11. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1492–96, 1498–1512 (1987) (book review).
12. Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549,
1553–54 (2012).
13. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative
Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty”
Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998) (evaluating of cooperative federalism).
14. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism,
118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1262 (2009).
15. Id.
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through dissent, thereby exerting power and influence in the
federal policymaking process. 16 Federalism along this model,
however, inverts the power relationship that is central to the
sovereignty narrative. That is, cooperative federalism, unlike
sovereignty federalism, assumes that the Federal
Government is preeminent and that the states, while given
the freedom to dissent and impede through uncooperative
methods, do not so much share power as react to it.
Sovereignty federalism and cooperative federalism
represent the two dominant federalism narratives among
Supreme Court justices and scholars. The Court consistently
invokes formal protections to safeguard the states’ right to
preside over their own empires. 17 Sovereignty scholars tend
to embrace this dualistic vision of federalism that locates
federalism’s success in the state’s ability to exercise supreme
policymaking authority within its own sphere of influence
without federal interference. 18 By contrast, academics that
lean toward cooperative federalism locate the states’ power in
their position as federal servants, not separate sovereigns. 19
Scholars have commented that even though these academics
tend to resist the rigid de jure “separate spheres” approach,
their de facto autonomy theories nevertheless reinforce the
basic sovereignty notion that states possess distinct identities
that allow them to function as sites of decision making
power. 20 In this Article, I attempt to enter the conversation
begun by others who argue that a polyphonic theory may
allow us to better understand contemporary federalism. 21 To
16. See, e.g., id.; see also Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism:
The Value of State-based Dissent to Federal Health Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV.
111 (2011).
17. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
18. Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549,
1553–54 (2012).
19. See Heather K. Gerken, Of Sovereigns and Servants, 115 YALE L.J.
2633, 2635 (2006). See, e.g., Daniel J. Elazar, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW
FROM THE STATES 162 (2d ed. 1972); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Cooperative
Federalism and Co-optation, 92 YALE L.J. 1344, 1346 (1983); Philip J. Weiser,
Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L.
REV. 663, 668 (2001).
20. Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 13 (2009) (“Even as scholars have rejected a sovereignty account, they
remain haunted by its ghost. They continue to deploy narratives about power,
jurisdiction, and identity that mirror those of sovereignty’s champions.”).
21. See Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91
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that end, this Article discusses the defects of sovereignty
federalism and cooperative federalism, both of which are (1)
subspecies of the Court’s long-standing dualist approach to
federalism, and (2) given expression in the Court’s ACA
opinions.
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in NFIB v. Sebelius mimics
the sovereignty narrative. 22 It privileges the concept of dual
federalism as inherited from those original framers of the
Constitution who distrusted centralized power. 23 His analysis
of the federal-state relationship emanates from a strict
adherence to protecting structural federalism by preserving
formalistic boundaries of state autonomy. 24 Conversely,
Justice Ginsburg’s concurring opinion is a robust defense of
Her power allocation analysis
cooperative federalism. 25
favors the Federal Government on all counts, implicitly
affirming the subordinate function of the states as mere

IOWA L. REV. 243, 248–49, 285–96 (2005).
In the polyphonic conception, federalism is characterized by the
existence of multiple, independent sources of political authority.
The scope of this political authority is defined by territory, not by
subject matter. No kind of conduct is categorically beyond the
boundaries of state or federal jurisdiction. The federal and state
governments function as alternative centers of power. In the first
instance, any matter is presumptively within the authority of the
federal government and of a state government. Full concurrent
power is the norm. A polyphonic conception of federalism thus
resists the idea of defining enclaves of state power protected
federal intrusion. . . . [P]olyphonic federalism rejects the dualist
vestiges of dual federalism.
Id. at 285.
22. See infra Part III.B.1.
23. See infra Part III.B.1.
24. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578.
(“‘State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: Rather, federalism secures to
citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.’
Because the police power is controlled by 50 different States instead of one
national sovereign, the facets of governing that touch on citizens’ daily lives are
normally administered by smaller governments closer to the governed. The
Framers thus ensured that powers which ‘in the ordinary course of affairs,
concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people’ were held by
governments more local and more accountable than a distant federal
bureaucracy. The independent power of the States also serves as a check on the
power of the Federal Government: ‘By denying any one government complete
jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of
the individual from arbitrary power.’ ” ) (internal citations omitted).
25. Id. at 2609–42 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
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implementers of federal programs. 26 Underscoring Justice
Ginsburg’s rationale is the idea that the Federal Government
is empowered to address problems of collective action
affecting multiple states. 27 While Justice Ginsburg’s opinion
reads as less anachronistic than Chief Justice Roberts’, it
nevertheless remains stuck in a bygone era, namely the New
Deal, when the exigencies of the Depression—and the states’
widespread inability to address those exigencies—forced the
Federal Government to take control of so many aspects of
American political and economic life. 28
Despite their differences as to where power originates
and resides, how it is imposed, and who exercises it over
whom, sovereignty federalism and cooperative federalism
have one critical component in common: they express the
relationship between the Federal Government and the states
in terms of force; the language used is almost always violent.
Under the sovereignty framework, the States are cast as
rivals of and challengers to the Federal Government in fields
of policy where the States would like to claim (or reclaim)
jurisdiction. The States operate as outsiders who retain
power only through vigilance, assertion, and other forms of
active self-preservation—all of which require an adversarial
posture and a language of violence; they engage in a neverending effort to police their perimeters and keep the Federal
Government at bay.
Ironically, conflict and violent rhetoric also play a role in
the “cooperative” federalism framework. When States are
viewed as passive implementers of federal policy, they may be
considered allies of the Federal Government, but they are still
inferiors whose only recourse is rebellion expressed in active
or passive resistance.
This resistance, which is often
implemented through a violent vocabulary, becomes more
pronounced under the more nuanced conceptions of
cooperative federalism offered by recent scholarship, for
example, rhetorical and uncooperative federalism. 29 While
26. See infra Part III.B.2.
27. See infra Part III.B.2.
28. See, for example, Ginsburg’s discussion of New Deal legislation and
Supreme Court cases at the beginning of Part II.D.1.b of her opinion. Sebelius,
132 S. Ct. at 2622 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment
in part, and dissenting in part).
29. See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 14; see also Leonard,
supra note 16.
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still perceiving the States as allies of the Federal
Government, both rhetorical and uncooperative federalism
advocate that the States must use their position to challenge
and dissent from within the system. Thus, even though the
States enjoy insider status under this construction of the
federal-state relationship, they are still limited to one of two
courses of action: resistance or submission.
The problem with a federalism discourse (or any
discourse) based on the exertion of force and expressed in
violent language is that it has nowhere to go; it is static, with
the players cemented into their respective positions. Just as
war represents the ultimate termination and failure of
diplomacy, bellicose language represents the end of
productive dialogue. The rhetoric is incapable of moving
anyone to a place where mutually acceptable solutions are
possible.
There is, however, an alternative. Jacques Derrida was
one of the most prolific philosophers of the twentieth century.
In his later works, he became increasingly concerned with
paradoxes: specifically, the idea that the possibility and
impossibility of a thing exist at the same time. 30 One of the
objects of his study of this possible-impossible paradox was
the concept of hospitality. 31 In Of Hospitality, Derrida
contends that the very nature of hospitality is self-defeating
because the host must surrender his home to the guest for the
With this in mind, Derrida
gesture to be complete. 32
differentiates between two notions of hospitality: “absolute”
hospitality, which he considers impossible, and “conditional”
hospitality, which, while possible, requires rules and agreedupon parameters to limit the guest and his ever-gnawing
hunger for power (for example, his desire to displace the host
and take over the house). 33
30. See, e.g., JACQUES DERRIDA, GIVEN TIME: I. COUNTERFEIT MONEY 12
(Peggy Kamuf trans., Chicago: University of Chicago Press) (1992) (suggesting
that a genuine gift is impossible because the notion of gift-giving implicitly
carries with it a demand for and obligation of reciprocity); JACQUES DERRIDA,
ON COSMOPOLITANISM AND FORGIVENESS 33 (Routledge, 2001) (arguing that
according to its own internal logic, genuine forgiving must involve the
impossible: that is, the forgiving of an ‘unforgivable’ transgression—e.g. a
‘mortal sin’).
31. JACQUES DERRIDA & ANNE DUFOURMANTELLE, OF HOSPITALITY 25
(Rachel Bowlby trans., 2000) [hereinafter, DERRIDA, OF HOSPITALITY].
32. Id. at 23, 25.
33. Id. at 25.
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Derrida’s notion of “hospitality,” in both its absolute and
conditional forms, provides a potent means of unpacking the
federalism issues that shape the ACA debate and opinion. I
assert that federalism takes on a different color when we seek
to understand it in terms of Derridean hospitality. Our
debates over federalism might actually move forward if we
were to view the struggle between federal power and state
sovereignty within the framework of hospitality. The hostguest framework would provide a new paradigm within which
to address the dilemmas of coordinated government inherent
in the federal-state relationship. Shifting the discourse into a
new paradigm creates space for innovative approaches to
resolve those dilemmas. Indeed, novel resolution strategies
may be more compatible with the modern construction of the
federal-state relationship and ultimately may result in more
effective governance.
This Article argues that hospitality, as conceived by
Derrida, offers an alternative language frame through which
to construct a new federalism discourse: one of host and guest
rather than rival and challenger. Derrida’s principle of
conditional hospitality, which protects the host’s sovereignty
by empowering him to establish boundaries and rules that
govern his relationship with the guest, is a framework that
stops short of violence and may initiate new and more
effective modes of behavior. Borrowing from this framework,
we can begin to construct a theory of Conditional Federalism,
a federal-state relationship that similarly stops short of
violence and offers the states more options than simply
rebellion on one hand or submission on the other. By
recognizing and protecting the sovereignty of the state,
Conditional Federalism would protect those structural
federalism values embraced by the sovereignty narrative, but
it would do so without incorporating the posture of conflict
that often takes shape within those values.
Moreover, by stopping short of violence and recognizing
the power of both the host and guest, Conditional Federalism
would allow for the creation of mutually acceptable conditions
or pacts. 34 These pacts would facilitate a form of governance
34. Id. at 5, 7, 21, 23, 25, 29. Much of Derrida’s theories on hospitality are
derived from the ancient Greek concept of the “foreigner” or xeno, as depicted in
Plato’s The Sophist, a dialogue in which Socrates discusses how to properly deal
with a stranger. Derrida explores this issue in great depth in Of Hospitality,
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that integrates the respective strengths of the state and
federal authorities to achieve a mutually designed objective.
Conditional Federalism can use hospitality to create and
reinforce a federal-state relationship built on a commitment
to governance, to the pact, which must be renewed each
generation. 35
Moreover, that commitment assumes an
aversion to violence. The hospitality paradigm displaces rival
and violence with partner and contractual limitation. It
incorporates the dominant components of the sovereignty and
cooperative federalism narratives into a new federalism
paradigm grounded in collaborative governance.
Part II of this Article introduces the basic principles of
Jacques Derrida’s theory of hospitality. Part III presents the
dominant federalism theories, including some of their more
nuanced offshoots. Part IV examines the Affordable Care Act
opinion, especially the portion of it that addresses the forced
expansion of Medicaid. After a brief summary of the case
outcome, this part analyzes Chief Justice Roberts’ and Justice
Ginsburg’s opinions and demonstrates how they illustrate
various aspects of the traditional federalism narratives.
Finally, Part V shows how Derrida’s hospitality principles
offer these federalism narratives a different framework
through which to conceive a new federalism paradigm—what
I call Conditional Federalism. In this part, I discuss the
common structural defect of the dominant federalism
discourse and offer hospitality as a new way of seeing and
speaking about the relationship between States and the
Federal Government. I also make an effort to show how the
principles of hospitality allow us to read the ACA opinion
differently, with a clearer idea of what is actually happening
in the text. I conclude Part V with the following argument:
the hospitality paradigm, by displacing the theme of violence
underlying dominant federalism narratives, has the potential
to create a federalism discourse of shared partnership,
allowing for transformative and more productive interaction

stressing the difference between a foreigner (xeno), with whom one can establish
a workable relationship through a pact or xenia, and a barbarian, with whom no
pact is possible. When extending an invitation of hospitality to a barbarian, the
host must be prepared to grant his guest complete liberty and power within the
house, and to allow the guest, the barbarian, to displace him as host. That is,
he must be prepared to become a hostage in his own home. Id.
35. Id. at 21, 23.
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and policymaking between the Federal Government and the
States.
I. DERRIDEAN PRINCIPLES OF DECONSTRUCTION AND
HOSPITALITY
The aim of this Article is to show how the text of the
Chief Justice and Justice Ginsburg’s opinions in Sebelius can
be deconstructed to reveal the ongoing debate between the
two dominant federalism theories.
This deconstruction
means to highlight the gaps between those two normative
positions and illustrate the inability of either theory to wholly
serve as a platform for more productive policymaking
between the Federal Government and the States. It is first
necessary, however, to provide a working understanding of
the purpose of a deconstructive technique. In so doing, we
can begin to appreciate the benefits that a hospitality
paradigm may have for moving beyond the impasse that the
dominant federalism narratives create. Derrida spent nearly
half a century introducing and developing his ideas about
deconstruction. 36 While a full assessment of his ideas is
beyond the scope of this paper, a brief explanation about the
deconstructive approach is necessary to place Derrida’s
hospitality principles in context.
A. Explaining Deconstruction: A Positive Mission
A deconstructive technique intervenes and engages with
a text with a view towards destabilizing its assumed or
dominant meaning. It challenges passivity and invites one to
pursue an active reading. Deconstruction began as a literary
theory which, when applied, would allow one to engage with
the great philosophers, like Plato and Aristotle, in a new
way. 37 The idea was to read philosophical texts in a manner
36. See, e.g., JACQUES DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE (Alan Bass
trans., 1978) (collecting Derrida’s essays written between 1959 and 1966
analyzing why and how metaphysical thinking excludes writing from its
conception of language, ultimately arguing that metaphysics itself is constituted
by this exclusion); JACQUES DERRIDA, SPEECH AND PHENOMENA: AND OTHER
ESSAYS ON HUSSERL’S THEORY OF SIGNS (David B. Allison & Newton Garver
trans., 1979); and JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak trans., 2d ed. 1998).
37. DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL: A CONVERSATION WITH JACQUES
DERRIDA 74–76 (John D. Caputo ed. with commentary, 1997) [hereinafter
DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL].
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that challenged the basis of their claim to “true” philosophy
without destroying wholesale, their contribution to modern
thought: to challenge the idea of the “purity” (and therefore
unassailability) of their philosophy without annihilating the
ideas themselves. 38
Overtime, deconstruction developed within other
academic departments and became a way to confront not only
political thinkers, but also politics itself. 39 Deconstruction
gives us a way to break free of inherited paradigms and
interpretations that stifle transformative thought. In fact,
deconstruction assumes that these paradigm and
interpretations are inherently unstable and contain within
them the seeds of their own destruction, and that they persist
only in a mask of strength, which, if pulled away, invites
inevitable self-collapse. “Deconstruction suggests that texts
and arguments with which we are most familiar contain
hidden and unexpected reserves, points of inner resistance,
dialogues, and alternatives.” 40
Deconstruction is suspicious of ideals, of purity, of
anything absolute. For Derrida, purity and origin are
phantoms. 41 Thus, a desire to return to some ideal form or
state is problematic. 42 First, it is unclear whether, if ever,
such a pure form or state ever existed. 43 Second, if it is
unclear whether a pure form or state ever existed, then we
need to account for the difference between acceptable and
unacceptable deviations. 44 That is not to say that one should
not make deviations should Rather, it is to suggest that
instead
of
assigning
blame
based
on
an

38. Id.
39. Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”,
11 CARDOZO L. REV. 920 (Mary Quaintance trans., 1990) (In 1989 Derrida gave
a lecture at a conference at the Cardozo Law School, the result of which was the
publication of The Force of Law. In his lecture, Derrida turned to political
philosophy and jurisprudence and associated his work with the critical legal
studies movement. The Force of Law signified the clear political turn of
deconstruction engaging itself with questions of political and ethical
responsibility toward law and justice.).
40. PENELOPE DEUTSCHER, HOW TO READ DERRIDA, at xii (2006).
41. Id. at 3.
42. Id. at 2.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 3 (“A far more complex question is which drugs and which
toxins, which interventions and modifications we will accept, which we will
exclude, and on what grounds.”).
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acceptable/unacceptable (insider/outsider) construction, we
should question the justifications for and coherence of our
notion of purity. 45 As Penelope Deutscher explains in How to
Read Derrida:
[t]he elevation of an ideal is a kind of lazy shortcut. If the
relevant ideal is open to question . . . we must grapple
with a responsibility we might prefer to avoid. Derrida
believes we should ask questions that probe the phantom
ideals implicitly at work in specific cultural, historical,
political or literary context. What kind of responsibility
comes with acknowledging the impossibility of those
ideals? 46

Deconstruction is a way to break down and challenge our
concept of purity and expose the instability of inherited
hierarchies and constructions. The destabilization that a
deconstructive critique produces is necessary to “provoke in
us a new kind of ethics in which new obligations and
decisions press on us.” 47
As this last sentence indicates, deconstruction is not
nihilistic. 48 Indeed, by destabilizing traditional hierarchies of
thinking, a deconstructive technique opens up space to create
new possibilities. That space can only be filled, however, by
those willing to accept responsibility for new ways of
thinking. It is through a deconstructive critique that we may
consent to welcome not only the present dominant voice, but
also the voice of the other. 49 Rather than nihilistic, this
process is in fact, aspirational. 50 Deconstruction lives in the
space between what we have (but are discontent with) and
what we want. 51 It enables a frame of mind that can perceive

45. See id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 7.
48. DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL, supra note 37, at 49 (“[There is a]
popular image of deconstruction as some sort of intellectual ‘computer virus’
that destroys . . . .”).
49. Id. at 57 (“[D]econstruction is not . . . a destruction or demolition, but a
way of releasing and responding, of listening and opening up, of being
responsible not only to the dominant voices of the great masters, but also to
other voices . . . .”).
50. Id. at 70 (“Deconstruction is nourished by a dream of the invention of
the other, of something to come . . . .”).
51. Id. (“[D]econstruction . . . always inhabits the distance between
something impossible . . . of which we dream and all the existing actualities and
foreseeable possibilities, with which we are more or less discontent.”).
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of aspiring to one state of being, while temporarily bound to
another. 52 This inclusive frame of mind avoids chaos. What
this means in the federalism context is that opening up to a
paradigmatic shift in thinking about how to navigate the
federal-state relationship does not necessarily require
immediate (or ultimate) discard of the sovereignty and
cooperative federalism paradigms.
Ultimately, deconstruction is positive and pragmatic. It
invites skepticism of inherited constructions to force selfreflection in a way that opens us up to new possibilities. The
purpose of this self-reflection is not destruction per se; rather,
it is to force a defense of the status quo and press change
where that defense cannot be justified. 53 That, according to
Derrida, is how, through the process of challenging law, one
can pursue justice. 54 Deconstruction is positive because it
creates the conditions that enable us to aspire to a state of
perpetual motion rather than to settle for a state of being.
Although a state of being is attainable, it is problematic
because it creates the false impression of purity and certainty
and stability.
“The very meaning and mission of
deconstruction is to show that things—texts, institutions,
traditions, societies, beliefs, and practices . . . do not have
definable meanings and determinable missions, that they are
always more than any mission would impose, that they
exceed the boundaries they currently occupy.” 55
Conversely, a state of perpetual motion seeks no ideal,
has no destination because the moment one arrives at a
destination or obtains an “ideal” (for example, a particular
state of being) one creates limits, conditions that prohibit
movement beyond. With the aspiration to a perpetual state of
motion, there are no inhibiting static markers, only
movement that constantly pushes against those limits to
52. Id.
53. Id. at 18 (“That is what gives deconstruction its movement, that is,
constantly to suspect, to criticize the given determinations of culture, of
institutions, of legal systems, not in order to destroy them or simply to cancel
them, but to be just with justice . . . .”).
54. Id. at 16 (“[Derrida] make[s] a distinction between the law, that is the
history of right, of legal systems, and justice. . . . You can improve law, you can
replace one law by another one. There are constitutions and institutions. This
is a history, and a history, as such, can be deconstructed. . . . But justice is not
the law. Justice is what gives us the impulse, the drive, or the movement to
improve the law, that is, to deconstruct the law.”).
55. DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL, supra note 37, at 31.
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consider a step beyond. This push creates a state that is
constantly transforming and therefore continually capable of
cultivating, even celebrating difference by making space for
possibility.
The experience and relentless pursuit of the impossible is
what deconstruction is all about. 56 “Liberalism for [Derrida]
is subjectivism, a philosophy in which everything turns on the
‘rights’ of the ‘autonomous subject,’ whereas deconstruction is
a philosophy of ‘responsibility to the other,’ where everything
turns on the turn to the other.” 57 “[I]t would not be a
distortion to say that deconstruction is to be understood as a
form of hospitality, that deconstruction is hospitality, which
is the welcoming of the other.” 58 In the discussion below,
however, we will see that welcoming the other has its risks.
As with virtually every Derridean principle, hospitality—
the essential human act of being a host—is inherently
unstable and therefore cannot be realized in any absolute or
ideal form. This point will loom large when we return to the
issue of American federalism, which, I argue, is itself founded
on a “hospitality” or “host-and-guest” paradigm. American
federalism, like unconditional hospitality, is impossible to
attain in the pure or absolute sense. In recognizing this fact,
however, we set ourselves free to explore the potential for a
more attainable and effective form of federalism—Conditional
Federalism.
B. Explaining Hospitality: Welcoming the Stranger
The concept of “hospitality” is interesting because, as
Derrida likes to point out, the word carries its own
contradiction within it. 59 The word “hospitality” means to
welcome in the “stranger.” 60 It derives from the Latin hoses,
formed from the word hostis, originally meaning stranger. 61
56. Id. at 32 (citing Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical
Foundation of Authority”, 11 CARDOZO L.REV. 920 (1990)).
57. DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL, supra note 37, at 109.
58. Id. at 109–10.
59. Jacques Derrida, Hospitality, 5 ANGELAKI: JOURNAL OF THE
THEORETICAL HUMAN. 3, 5 (Barry Stocker & Forbes Morlock trans., 2000)
(“Hospitality is a self-contradictory concept and experience which can only selfdestruct <put otherwise, produce itself as impossible, only be possible on the
condition of its impossibility>. . . .”).
60. DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL, supra note 37, at 110.
61. Id.
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The word “hospitality” developed by taking hostis, which
evolved to mean enemy or “hostile” stranger (hostilis), and
appending pets (potis, poets, potentia) meaning “to have
power.” 62 Given this etymology, the two main characteristics
of the word “hospitality” are welcoming and power. 63 These
characteristics are interdependent. The welcoming of the
guest, the stranger, immediately interposes risk and requires
that the host be on guard lest he lose power and mastery over
his premises. 64
The two main characteristics of hospitality create an
inherent tension in the concept of hospitality. This tension
stems from the fact that hospitality requires the host to give a
place to the stranger by welcoming him in while at the same
time retaining control over the place in which the host has
received the stranger. “There is an essential ‘self-limitation’
built right into the idea of hospitality, which preserves the
distance between one’s own and the stranger, between owning
one’s own property and inviting the other into one’s home. So
there is always a little hostility in all hosting and hospitality
. . . .”65
The idea that the host must retain mastery and
ownership over the property is vital to the concept of
hospitality. “A host is a host only if he owns the place, and
only if he holds onto his ownership.” 66 The way that a host
holds onto his ownership is by limiting the welcoming.
When the host says to the guest, ‘Make yourself at home,’
this is a self-limiting invitation. ‘Make yourself at home’
means: please feel at home, act as if you were at home, but
remember, that is not true, this is not your home but
mine, and you are expected to respect my property. When
I say ‘Welcome’ to the other, ‘Come cross my threshold,’ I
am not surrendering my property or my identity. . . . If I
say, ‘Welcome,’ I am not renouncing my mastery . . . . 67

The tension between host and guest carries within it
latent animus and the potential for violence. And if the
62. Id.
63. See DERRIDA, OF HOSPITALITY, supra note 31, at 53–55.
64. Id.
65. DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL, supra note 37, at 110.
66. Id. at 110. “[T]he host, he who offers hospitality, must be the master in
his house, he . . . must be assured of his sovereignty over the space and goods he
offers or opens to the other as stranger.” Derrida, supra note 59, at 14.
67. DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL, supra note 37, at 111.
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host/guest relationship were permanently locked in this
arrangement, violence would emerge as its chief feature.
Worse, the state of imminent or actual violence would be
permanent, un-transcendable. However, the characteristics
of welcoming and power actually create two forms of
hospitality: unconditional and conditional.
Pure,
unconditional, for example, absolute, hospitality is what
emerges when the host is confronted not with a foreigner or
xeno with whom the host shares certain familial or social ties,
Pure,
but with a barbarian, the absolute other. 68
unconditional hospitality does not require a pact or
reciprocity of obligation, in part because only a host and guest
who share certain social or familial customs can enter into a
pact. 69 “[U]nconditional hospitality implies that you don’t ask
the other, the newcomer, the guest to give anything back. . . .
[T]he condition of unconditional hospitality [is] that you give
up the mastery of your space, your home, your nation. It is
unbearable.” 70 When Derrida says that pure hospitality is
“unbearable,” he means that it cannot persist for more than a
few moments, because as soon as the barbarian guest enters
the house, he immediately moves to displace the host, who
has stepped aside and allowed himself to become captive. 71
At that moment, hospitality is over. 72
Therefore, to sustain itself, all hospitality must be
conditional. The idea that absolute hospitality is impossible
is key to Derrida’s consideration of the notion of hospitality
within the possible-impossible paradox. 73 Given that absolute
means without limitation, imagining hospitality in the
extreme (i.e., without conditions) is unfeasible. 74 “This is not
so much an ideal; it is an impossible ideal.” 75
This impossibility is not, however, negative.
“Like
everything else in deconstruction, the possibility of
hospitality is sustained by its impossibility . . . .” 76 In other
words, the pursuit of hospitality begins with the sovereign’s
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

DERRIDA, OF HOSPITALITY, supra note 31, at 23, 25.
Id. at 25–29.
DEUTSCHER, supra note 40, at 65.
See DERRIDA, OF HOSPITALITY, supra note 31, at 53, 55, 123, 125.
See id.
DEUTSCHER, supra note 40, at 68.
Id.
Id.
DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL, supra note 37, at 111.
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welcome of the other and invitation they make themselves
feel at home in the sovereign’s property. 77 The invitation can
only be made if the sovereign retains complete control of the
property. 78 The guest can only truly feel at home in his or her
own home. 79 The necessary predicates: (1) for the host to
have the power to invite and (2) for the guest to truly feel at
home cannot exist simultaneously.
Thus, for hospitality to occur, it is necessary for
hospitality to go beyond [itself]. That requires that the
host must, in a moment of madness, tear up the
understanding between him and the guest, act with
“excess,” make an absolute gift of his property, which is of
course impossible. But that is the only way a guest can go
away feeling as if he was really made at home. 80

This dilemma creates a positive dynamic because the
only way to experience hospitality is through the pursuit of
its impossibility, through the imperfect struggle with the
responsibility of welcoming the other into one’s home. The
transformation comes when the host imposes limits on the
guest so as to retain the host’s sovereignty, and the guest
reciprocates by accepting some of those limits and rejecting
others. In this sense, the dynamic between host and guest
becomes one of bargaining, of contracting, of building a pact.
Derrida’s interest in exploring the tensions within
“hospitality” is not aimed at cynically unmasking it as just
more mastery and power. . . . On the contrary, he wants to
show that hospitality is inhabited from within, inwardly
disturbed by these tensions, but he does this precisely in
order to open hospitality up, to keep it on guard against
itself . . . to open—to push—it beyond itself. For it is only
that internal tension and instability that keeps the idea of
hospitality alive, open, loose. If it is not beyond itself, it
falls back into itself and becomes a bit of ungracious
meanness, that is, hostile.” 81

Impossibility, therefore, is not meaningless; impossibility
produces transformation.
Though impossible, pure,
unconditional hospitality has a function; it gives conditional
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 112.
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hospitality its purpose and meaning. 82 “Derrida argues that
acts of conditional hospitality take place only in the shadow of
the impossibility of their ideal version.” 83 This requires that
the decision-maker push against the established limits and
engage with the prospect of “more.” Impossibility resists
producing phantom ideals of purity because it pushes us to
create and justify limits and conditions. Each limit or
condition creates a threshold, which sparks the imagination
of those who contemplate the change of a step beyond it. The
process of negotiating with impossibility to set limits and
then contemplating pushing beyond them opens us up to
possibilities of transformation. Thus, deconstruction and
hospitality are a way to improve the law.
Before temporarily leaving Derrida and his ideas on
hospitality, I must address the violence that is inherent in the
host-guest relationship. At the beginning of this article, I
stated that hospitality offered a way to transcend the current
discourse on American federalism—a discourse I argue is
paralyzed in the language of violence. Given the distrust that
emerges the moment the host invites the guest into the
house, it seems unlikely that hospitality provides a means of
raising any discourse out of the cemented postures of battle.
The difference is that hospitality, while recognizing that
violence inheres naturally in the host-guest relationship,
further recognizes that this same violence renders the goal of
hospitality unattainable. It must therefore be transcended;
swords are set aside in favor of pens and paper. In this way,
hospitality moves beyond its absolute and impossible form. It
moves toward a more pragmatic mode of being—a politics
that is sustainable for an extended period of time. This, I
argue, is the lesson that must be applied to the discourse on
American federalism.
II. DOMINANT FEDERALISM THEORIES
There are two dominant federalism theories that scholars
and courts use to explain federal-state relations. Each one
represents a distinct and separate vision of the concept of the
state (as opposed to the Federal Government). The first is a
concept of dual federalism and can be labeled the sovereignty
82. See DEUTSCHER, supra note 40, at 68.
83. Id.
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theory. 84 This theory frames the federal-state relationship in
an adversarial posture depicting the states as rivals to federal
policymakers. 85 This theory privileges the state’s role as an
autonomous policymaker. 86 The second theory is known as
This theory views the states
cooperative federalism. 87
primarily as implementers of federal policy. 88 Cooperative
federalism frames the federal-state relationship in a united
posture depicting the states as allies (albeit subordinate ones)
to federal policymakers. 89 These two theories construct dual
largely competing narratives of the federal-state relationship.
The first is an external narrative that posits the states as
existing outside the Federal Government. The second is an
internal narrative that perceives of the states as insiders and
passive implementers of federal policymaking.
A. Sovereignty Theory
This theory is grounded in respect for a state’s autonomy
to function as an independent policymaker. Under this
model, state autonomy serves to accomplish the values
underlying federalism, i.e., creating laboratories of
diffusing
power 91;
fostering
choice 92;
democracy90;
84. Gerken, supra note 12, at 1553 & n.8.
85. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: “Converse-1983” in
Context, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1236–37 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, Five Views
of Federalism]; Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J.
1425, 1492–93 (1987) [hereinafter Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism]
(urging states to rival and challenge the federal government but from the
posture of sovereign power).
86. Gerken, supra note 12, at 1553.
87. Id. at 1556.
88. See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 19, at 1346; Philip J. Weisner,
Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the
Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1695–97 (2001); Weiser, supra note 19, at
668; see generally Joseph F. Zimmerman, National-State Relations: Cooperative
Federalism in the Twentieth Century, 31 PUBLIUS: THE JOURNAL OF
FEDERALISM 15, 20–22 (Spring 2001) (discussing the relationship between
states and the Federal Government in the cooperative federal system).
89. See Gerken, supra note 19, at 2635 (noting that in the cooperative
paradigm states draw their power from their insider position as federal
servants rather than from their autonomous power as separate sovereigns).
90. See New State Ice. Co., v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”);
DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE, 103 (1995); Amar, Five Views of
Federalism, supra note 85, at 1233–36; Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of
Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 528 (1995); McConnell, supra note 11, at 1493.

CISNEROS FINAL

38

4/26/2014 12:21 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

safeguarding individual rights 93; and enhancing democratic
participation by the citizenry. 94 Under this model, the states
interact with the Federal Government through resistance,
and dissent. 95 Because the States retain a separate and
distinct sphere of power, they are by definition rivals of the
Federal Government and often feel compelled to challenge
federal power. 96 This dissent is viewed as necessary to
maintain the integrity of the federal scheme. 97 This narrative
finds support in the general idea underlying the Framers’
constitutional design, which held that a certain amount of
resistance and deliberative political conflict in government
was desirable. 98 More specifically, it finds expressive force in
those scholarly writings and judicial opinions that emphasize
the Framer’s intent to grant only enumerated powers to the
Federal Government, leaving all other powers to the
On the Derridean “hospitality”
individual states. 99
continuum, sovereignty federalism would represent that point
where the host has invited the guest through the door and is
now on guard against his—the guest’s—irresistible desire to
take over every room in the house.

41.

91. See, e.g., Amar, Five Views of Federalism, supra note 85, at 1236–40.
92. McConnell, supra note 11, at 1493.
93. See, e.g., Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note 85, at 1440–

94. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 90, at 527; Betsy J. Grey, The New
Federalism Jurisprudence and National Tort Reform, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
475, 511 (2002); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State
Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1988);
Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1,
58–59 (2004).
95. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 145 (2003);
(“American founders’ largest contribution consisted in their design of a system
that would ensure a place for diverse views in government.”).
96. See generally Gerken, supra note 12; Amar, Of Sovereignty and
Federalism, supra note 85.
97. Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1749
(2005) (“[D]issent . . . contributes to the marketplace of ideas, engages electoral
minorities . . . , and facilitates self-expression.”) (emphasis omitted); Merritt,
supra note 94, at 5–6 (asserting that states may act as lobbyists and litigants to
challenge federal policies and programs).
98. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 426–27 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[D]ifferences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties . . . often
promote deliberation and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the
majority.”).
99. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution . . . , are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”).
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B. Cooperative Federalism Theory
Opposing the sovereignty federalism theory is
This theory recognizes the
cooperative federalism. 100
practical necessity of embracing a federal-state relationship
that acknowledges that federal policymaking power in the
modern age is broad in scope and now penetrates deeply into
local fields of governance. 101 This theory shifts emphasis from
autonomy to integration. 102 Under this model, the states
interact with the Federal Government as supportive allies
and faithful agents implementing federal policy. 103 Although
allies, the states do occasionally chafe under the yoke of
federal power and make attempts at rebellion. 104 To the
extent that these efforts are successful, they tend to change
only the content of the directive from the Federal
Government, not the power structure, which makes that
directive possible.
Like sovereignty federalism, cooperative federalism has
an analog on the continuum of Derridean hospitality. It
exists at a point well past the initial moment of contact
100. For scholarship discussing cooperative federalism, see, for example,
DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 162 (2d
ed. 1972); MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW OF
GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1966); John Kincaid,
The Competitive Challenge to Cooperative Federalism: A Theory of Federal
Democracy, in COMPETITION AMONG STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:
EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 87 (Daphne A. Kenyon &
John Kincaid eds., 1991); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 19; Weiser, supra note 19;
Zimmerman, supra note 87. For a historical perspective, see, for example,
Harry N. Scheiber, American Federalism and the Diffusion of Power: Historical
and Contemporary Perspectives, 9 U. TOL. L. REV. 619 (1978).
101. Weiser, supra note 19, at 665 (arguing that because so many federal
regulatory programs are heavily dependent on state implementation, it is a
mistake to “view[] each jurisdiction as a separate entity that regulates in its
own distinct sphere of authority”).
102. Gerken, supra note 18, at 7 (discussing cooperative federalism
scholarship’s location of state power in integration and interdependence with
the federal government rather than autonomy and independence from it).
103. See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption,
and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1550) (2007) (noting
that while cooperative federalism programs “typically involve a federal statute
that regulates a risk or addresses a social ill or need” but “do not depend solely
on federal actors for their implementation and enforcement”); Rose-Ackerman,
supra note 19, at 1346 (illustrating how Medicaid exemplifies the states’ role in
implementing a federal program).
104. Gerken, supra note 18, at 35–40 (arguing that the states possess a
vertical checks and balances power on the federal government by virtue of their
servile position within the cooperative federalism model).

CISNEROS FINAL

40

4/26/2014 12:21 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

between the host and guest, beyond even that moment when
they move around each other uneasily, testing each other’s
resolve. Instead, cooperative federalism assumes that the
guest has already taken over the house, displaced the host,
and made him a servant. The original host, now held in an
inferior position, can assert himself only through subterfuge,
which is risky and, even if successful, will never return him to
“head of the house.”
III. THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT OPINION
NFIB v. Sebelius operates as a point of intersection
between the legal discourse of federalism and the
philosophical discourse of hospitality. As a bridge between
the two, the Affordable Care Act case provides points of
illustration of both the problems inherent in the dominant
federalism narratives as well as the opportunities for
engaging in a new way of speaking about the federal-state
relationship. After summarizing the main legal points of
Sebelius, this section focuses on key language from both Chief
Justice Roberts’ opinion and Justice Ginsburg’s opinion. This
textual focus illustrates the dominant federalism narrative to
which each relied as the normative underpinning to their
analysis, for example, sovereignty and cooperative federalism
respectively.
A. ACA Case Summary
In March 2010, President Obama signed the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) into law. 105
Lawsuits
challenging
the
constitutionality
of
the
comprehensive healthcare reform measure immediately
In March of 2012, the Supreme Court in
followed. 106
consolidated cases National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius 107 heard six hours of oral argument over
three days concerning the constitutionality of four aspects of
105. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010).
106. See Liberty Univ. Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2011); Virginia
ex rel. Cuccinelle v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011); Thomas Moore Law
Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011); Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1
(D.C. Cir. 2011); Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs.,
648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011).
107. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012).
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the ACA: (1) whether Congress has the power to enact an
individual mandate that requires nearly all Americans to
purchase health insurance or pay a fine; 108 (2) whether the
Act’s expansion of Medicaid eligibility amounts to
unconstitutional federal coercion of the states; (3) whether, if
found unconstitutional, the individual mandate is severable,
allowing the rest of the health care law to stand; and finally;
(4) assuming the individual purchase mandate constitutes a
tax, whether the Anti-Injunction Act 109 prohibits the Court
from hearing the issue before the tax laws take effect.
On June 28, 2012, the Court issued its 5-4 decision
upholding the ACA, the central legislative achievement of the
Obama Administration, with Chief Justice Roberts siding
with four of the Court’s more liberal members. 110 The Court
also held that the Anti-Injunction Act was not applicable to
the ACA’s individual mandate provision and therefore, did
not prevent the Court from exercising jurisdiction. 111
Chief Justice Roberts joined by Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan upheld the individual
mandate as a constitutional exercise of Congress’s power to
tax. 112 Despite the fact that the ACA labeled the fine
triggered by failure to purchase health insurance a
“penalty,” 113 the Chief Justice explained that labels were not

108. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2013) (requiring non-exempt individuals to maintain
“minimum essential” health insurance coverage or pay a fine).
109. Id. § 7421(a) (providing that “no suit for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any
person.” In other words, those subject to a tax must first pay it and then sue for
a refund). The Supreme Court itself stated that “taxes are the life-blood of
government, and their prompt and certain availability an imperious need.” Bull
v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935).
110. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus, 132 S. Ct. at 2608.
111. Id. at 2584. The AIA was arguably relevant to the ACA because the
individual mandate does not go into effect until 2014 and therefore no citizen
would be required to pay a penalty for failure to purchase insurance until 2015.
Id. at 2580. The ACA litigation sought to prevent collection of the fine from
those individuals who decided not to purchase health insurance according to the
terms of the individual mandate provision. Id. at 2582. The Court held that the
Congress did not intend for the payment to be treated as a tax for purposes of
the AIA, and while the label did not control for purposes of determining
constitutionality, it was dispositive in terms of determining whether the AIA
applied. Id. at 2584.
112. See id. at 2598; see generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“Congress
shall have the Power to Lay and collect Taxes.”).
113. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2594.
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dispositive. 114
Instead, he referenced a well-settled
prudential rule of constitutional adjudication requiring that
“if a statute has two possible meanings, one of which violates
the Constitution, courts should adopt the meaning that does
not do so.” 115 Because “every reasonable construction must be
resorted to, in order to save a statute from
unconstitutionality,” 116 the Chief Justice continued, the
question was not whether the payment was a tax under the
most natural reading of the Act, but whether it was a “fairly
possible” 117 one. 118 A majority of the Court held that it was. 119
Although failing to produce a single opinion, the Chief
Justice joined the dissenters in concluding 120 that the
individual mandate was not a proper use of Congress’ power
under the Commerce Clause 121 and the Necessary and Proper
Clause. 122 The Chief’s opinion approvingly cited to the
activity/inactivity distinction, which had permeated the
health care debate:
The individual mandate, however, does not regulate
existing commercial activity. It instead compels
individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a
product, on the ground that their failure to do so affects
interstate commerce. Construing the Commerce Clause to
permit Congress to regulate individuals precisely because
they are doing nothing would open a new and potentially

114. See id. at 2594–95.
115. Id. at 2593 (“No court ought, unless the terms of an act rendered it
unavoidable, to give a construction to it which should involve a violation,
however unintentional, of the constitution.” (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet.
433, 448–49 (1830)). Moreover, “the rule is settled that as between two possible
interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by
the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save the Act.” Id.
(quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring)).
116. Id. at 2594 (quoting, Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)).
117. Id. (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2598 (“Our precedent demonstrates that Congress had the power
to impose the exaction in [section] 5000A under the taxing power, and that
[section] 5000A need not be read to do more than impose a tax. That is enough
to sustain it.”).
120. See id. at 2593.
121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power to “regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States”).
122. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (giving Congress the power to “make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” the
powers enumerated in the Constitution).
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vast domain to congressional authority. 123

Stating that the Commerce Clause was not a “general
license [permitting Congress] to regulate an individual from
cradle to grave,” the Chief Justice concluded that the
mandate exceeded the scope of Congress’s power to regulate
commerce. 124
As to the Government’s Necessary and Proper Clause
argument, the Chief’s opinion declared that precedent
confined the scope of the clause to sanction only those laws
that “involved exercises of [Congress’s] authority derivative
of, and in service to, a granted power.” 125 Here, the Chief
stated, “[t]he individual mandate . . . vests Congress with the
extraordinary ability to create the necessary predicate to the
Thus, the Chief
exercise of an enumerated power.” 126
concluded, even if the individual mandate was “necessary” to
the ACA’s insurance reforms, it was not a “proper” means of
enacting them. 127
A majority of the justices also agreed that another
challenged provision of the Act, a significant expansion of
Medicaid, was not a valid exercise of Congress’ spending
power, as it would coerce states to either accept the expansion
or risk losing existing Medicaid funding. 128 The Spending
Clause authorizes Congress to “pay the Debts and provide for
the common Defense and general Welfare of the United
States.” 129 Although the spending power permits Congress to
incentivize state participation in federal programs by
conditioning receipt of federal funding on compliance, the
conditions must permit a State to voluntarily and knowingly
accept the terms of any such program. 130 The spending
power, the Chief stated, does not permit “the Federal
Government [to] compel the States to enact or administer a
federal regulatory program.” 131
123. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2587.
124. See id. at 2591.
125. Id. at 2592.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 2605, 2666 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito JJ., dissenting).
129. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
130. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct at 2574 (citing Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
131. Id. at 2601 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188
(1992)).
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The ACA included an expansion provision that directed
states to adjust their Medicaid eligibility rules to cover all
people with income less than 133% of the federal poverty
line. 132 The ACA authorizes the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to revoke Medicaid funding from those states
that decline to expand coverage. 133 As written, the Act
permits the Secretary to revoke both funds for the expansion
as well as funding for existing state Medicaid programs. 134 In
his opinion, the Chief Justice differentiated the existing
Medicaid program from the Medicaid expansion, observing
that the “original program was designed to cover medical
services for four particular categories of the needy: the
disabled, the blind, the elderly, and needy families with
dependent children,” 135 whereas the expansion changed
Medicaid “into a program to meet the healthcare needs of the
entire nonelderly population with income below 133 percent
of the poverty level”. 136 This “shift in kind,” the Chief stated,
means that “[Medicaid] is no longer a program to care for the
neediest among us, but rather an element of a comprehensive
national plan to provide universal health insurance
coverage.” 137 The Chief concluded, “A State could hardly
anticipate that Congress’s reservation of the right to “alter” or
“amend” the Medicaid program included the power to
transform it so dramatically.” 138 The Chief Justice found that
the withholding—not the granting—of federal funds was
incompatible with the Spending Clause. 139 Thus, in a narrow
decision, the Court upheld the Medicaid expansion as
available to any State that willingly chose to participate, but
precluded the Secretary from applying section 1396c to
withdraw existing Medicaid funds from states that decided
not to participate. 140
The Court did not reach the severability issue as it
related to the individual mandate because it found that the
mandate was a constitutional exercise of Congress’s taxing
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2013).
Id. § 1396c.
Id.
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus, 132 S. Ct at 2605–06.
Id. at 2606.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 2607.
See id. at 2608.
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power. 141 The Court did, however, discuss severability as it
related to the Medicaid expansion. 142 Although Justices
Ginsburg and Sotomayor were of the view that the Spending
Clause did not prevent the Secretary from withdrawing
existing Medicaid funds from any state that declined to
participate in the Medicaid expansion, they nevertheless
agreed with the Chief Justice’s conclusion that the Medicaid
Act’s severability clause 143 determined the appropriate
remedy “[i]f any provision of [the Medicaid Act], or the
application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held
invalid, the remainder of the chapter, and the application of
such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be
affected thereby.” 144
Concluding that Congress would have wanted the rest of
the ACA to stand had it known that the States would have a
genuine choice as to whether to participate in the Medicaid
expansion, the other provisions of the ACA were not
affected. 145
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissented,
arguing that the individual mandate was unconstitutional
because it exceeded the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause
power. 146 They also argued that the constitutionality of the
mandate could not be sustained by reclassifying it as a tax
rather than a penalty. 147 The Justices contended that to
reclassify the penalty as a tax was not interpreting the
statute, but rewriting it. 148 Finally, the dissenters argued
that because both the individual mandate and the withdrawal
of existing Medicaid funds from those states that declined to
participate in the Medicaid expansion exceeded Congress’s
constitutional authority, the ACA should be deemed
inoperable and struck down in its entirety. 149

141. See id. at 2598.
142. See id. at 2607–08.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 1303 (2013).
144. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2607 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
145. Id. at 2607–08.
146. See id. at 2644 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito JJ., dissenting).
147. See id. at 2650–56.
148. Id. at 2655.
149. Id. at 2643.
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B. ACA Opinion Illustration of Dominant Federalism Theories
The ACA litigation raises two separate federalism claims.
The first was whether the statute’s individual mandate
exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause power by “completely
obliterating the Constitution’s distinction between national
and local authority.” 150 The second was whether the Medicaid
expansion violated the tenth Amendment by compelling the
states to accept it. 151 Although the two claims challenged
different sources of Congress’s power (the individual mandate
was grounded in the Commerce Clause power or alternatively
Congress’s taxing power, whereas the Medicaid expansion
was grounded in Congress’s exercise of its Spending Clause
power), the underlying question driving the opinions’
rationale in Sebelius was the same: do the principles of
federalism allow Congress to exercise federal power in this
way?
While conducting separate doctrinal analyses to
determine whether Congress had exceeded the scope of any
one power (commerce, taxing, spending) the question about
the proper conception of federalism drove each of those
analyses. Even though the opinions’ analytical outcomes
differed, as did their reliance on separate theories of
federalism to support those outcomes, the opinions’ were
nevertheless framed in the same discourse: violence.
1. Chief Justice Roberts and the Sovereignty Theory of
Federalism
Chief Justice Roberts began his opinion by reiterating
traditional values of federalism: restraining power, 152
150. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000).
151. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct at 2601–09.
152. Id. at 2577–78.
[T]he Constitution did not initially include a Bill of Rights at least
partly because the Framers felt the enumeration of powers
sufficed to restrain the Government. As Alexander Hamilton put
it, ‘the Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every
useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS.’. And when the Bill of Rights
was ratified, it made express what the enumeration of powers
necessarily implied: ‘The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution . . . are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.’ The Federal Government has
expanded dramatically over the past two centuries, but it still
must show that a constitutional grant of power authorizes each of
its actions. See, e.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126
(2010).
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enhancing democratic rule by providing government that is
closer to the people, 153 and decreasing the likelihood of federal
tyranny. 154 This reiteration signals the dominant federalism
theory Roberts uses to support his doctrinal outcomes:
sovereignty. While the majority of this paper focuses on how
Roberts’ and Ginsburg’s opinions address the Medicaid
expansion, analysis of the Chief Justice’s treatment of the
individual mandate is in order because it operates within the
same violence framework that dominates his Spending
Clause analysis. As to both doctrinal analyses—whether the
individual mandate exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause
power and whether the Medicaid expansion compels states
under Congress’s Spending Power—the Chief Justice’s
opinion is framed in the discourse of conflict, of turf wars, of
violence. This discourse of conflict represents an approach
consistent with Derrida’s notion of absolute hospitality—it
describes the point where the guest has pushed the host to
near-surrender.
Roberts’ analysis of the individual mandate begins with
the first order inquiry: at what point does inertia become
activity? As indicated in the preceding section, the Chief’s
opinion held that although the individual mandate was
unconstitutional as an exercise of Congress’s Commerce
Clause power, it was a constitutional exercise of Congress’s
taxing power. 155 Rather than rely on the customary allocation
Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton); U.S. CONST. amend.
X; and citing U.S. v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010)). See also New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (“State sovereignty is not just an end in
itself: ‘[r]ather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the
diffusion of sovereign power.’ ” ) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,
759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
153. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2578 (“Because the police
power is controlled by 50 different States instead of one national sovereign, the
facets of governing that touch on citizens’ daily lives are normally administered
by smaller governments closer to the governed. The Framers thus ensured that
powers which ‘in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and
properties of the people’ were held by governments more local and more
accountable than a distant federal bureaucracy.” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO.
45 (James Madison))).
154. Id. (“The independent power of the States also serves as a check on the
power of the Federal Government: ‘By denying any one government complete
jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of
the individual from arbitrary power.’ ” (quoting Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct
2355, 2364 (2011))).
155. Id. at 2598.
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of subject matter authority between the federal government
and the states, which, for example, identifies criminal law,
family law, and education, as traditional subjects of state
regulation, 156 Roberts instead focused on the nature of the
regulated conduct defined in terms of activity and inactivity:
The individual mandate, however, does not regulate
existing commercial activity. It instead compels
individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a
product, on the ground that their failure to do so affects
interstate commerce. Construing the Commerce Clause to
permit Congress to regulate individuals precisely because
they are doing nothing would open a new and potentially
vast domain to congressional authority. 157
To an economist, perhaps, there is no difference between
activity and inactivity; both have measurable economic
effects on commerce. But the distinction between doing
something and doing nothing would not have been lost on
the Framers[.] 158
The Framers gave Congress the power to regulate
commerce, not compel it, and for over 200 years both our
decisions and Congress’s actions have reflected this
understanding. There is no reason to depart from that
understanding now. 159
The Commerce Clause is not a general license to regulate
an individual from cradle to grave, simply because he will
predictably engage in particular transactions. Any police
power to regulate individuals as such, as opposed to their
activities, remains vested in the States. 160

Although each of these passages expresses and/or
reinforces the same idea—that Congress’s commerce power is
limited to actual commercial activity and does not extend to a
person’s decision not to enter a particular market—I want to
156. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615–16 (2000) (“Petitioners’
reasoning, moreover, will not limit Congress to regulating violence but may, as
we suggested in Lopez, be applied equally well to family law and other areas of
traditional state regulation since the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and
child rearing on the national economy is undoubtedly significant.”); see also id.
at 618 (“The regulation and punishment intrastate violence that is not directed
at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has
always been the province of the States.”).
157. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2587.
158. Id. at 2589.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2591.
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focus on Roberts’ statement that “[t]he Framers gave
Congress the power to regulate commerce, not compel it
. . . .” 161 The sentence fits the Derridean hospitality formula
almost perfectly. It poses the Framers (representing the
People through the States) as the original hosts and Congress
as the guest invited in to assist with the running of the house
(the new nation, the United States). In this invitation, the
host gives the guest certain powers, among them the power to
regulate commerce among the several states, whose
sovereignty exists a priori. But something has happened
along the way: the xeno—the foreigner/guest, Congress—has
moved to increase his power beyond the original grant and is
no longer content to regulate commerce but now wishes to
compel commerce, which conveniently would give the guest
the ability to bring virtually every human decision within its
original grant of power. If the host—the Framers, the
states—were to accept this graft upon the guest’s initial
power to regulate commerce, all sovereignty would be lost,
thus manifesting Derrida’s notion of the impossibility of
hospitality. 162
Roberts’ word choice is also telling and reflects
mimetically the violence that has now invested the host-guest
relationship. “Regulate,” while hardly passive, is a word that
signals oversight of activities already in progress, activities
freely chosen by the participants. The regulator’s power is
undeniable but latent and limited, exercised only to ensure a
smooth flow of trade. “Compel” is different. To compel is to
force someone to do something he or she otherwise refuses to
do. It involves pressure, overwhelming and irresistible
pressure. It is not surprising, then, that Chief Justice
Roberts and the four other “sovereignty” federalists on the
Court could not abide Congress’s wish to drive each American
adult into the health insurance market, where he or she will
161. Id. at 2589.
162. DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL, supra note 37, at 111 (noting, “for
hospitality to occur, it is necessary for hospitality to beyond hospitality. That
requires that the host must, in a moment of madness, tear up the
understanding between him and the guest, act with ‘excess,’ make an absolute
gift of his property, which is of course impossible.”). Beginning with his famous
1963 lecture on Foucault, Derrida repeatedly invoked the “moment of madness”
line from Kierkegaard, often translated from his French as “the instant of
decision is madness” (L’Instant de la De’cision est une Folie). DERRIDA, WRITING
AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 36, at 31.
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be regulated by the Federal Government until death.
Roberts’ decision to uphold the individual mandate
provision under Congress’s taxing power can be reconciled
with the Court’s decision not to apply the Anti-Injunction Act
given the different parameters of a statutory (for example,
the application of the Anti-Injunction Act to the “shared
responsibility payment”) versus constitutional (for example,
the scope of Congress’s taxing power authority)
interpretation. What is interesting, however, is the way
Roberts’ position coincides with the ideas inherent in
sovereignty federalism, in that it reinforces the hierarchical
relationship between the states and the federal government.
Perhaps in recognition of Congress’s ability to enact a “singlepayer” national health insurance system, in which the states
would play no decision-making role at all, Roberts found a
way to preserve the individual mandate while exposing it as a
top-down use of federal power, i.e., a federal tax imposed on
the citizens. Not only does this lock the federal and state
governments in a clash over policy, it foments dissent among
individuals because it characterizes Congress’s action as a
“tax,” which is arguably among the most contemptible words
in American political parlance. To put this in Derridean
“hospitality” terms, the host, seeing he cannot resist by direct
means the guest’s intrusion into yet another domain
previously outside the guest’s reach, attempts to poison it by
calling it the one thing most likely to generate political
opposition—in this case, a tax. 163 Through this process, with
all of its language queues, Roberts continues to operate
within a system that perpetuates the master/slave
relationship: a relationship that reinforces government power
through violence rather than cooperation.
Although implicit in the Chief Justice’s analysis of the
individual mandate, the discourse of violence becomes explicit
when the Chief’s opinion turns to the Medicaid expansion and
Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause. Roberts
began by framing the issue as a threat. “[The States] claim
that Congress is coercing the States to adopt the changes it
wants by threatening to withhold all of a State’s Medicaid

163. In this analogy, Chief Justice Roberts give voice to the host-states. In a
sense, the states are “speaking” the only way a state can speak in a judicial
opinion, through a member of the Court.
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grants, unless the State accepts the new expanded funding
and complies with the conditions that come with it.” 164
What is interesting is that initially Roberts
acknowledged that the Court’s jurisprudence provided a
nonviolent framework through which to discuss productive
federal-state relations in terms of policymaking and
implementation. In fact, what he described rather resembles
Derrida’s concept of the “hospitality” pact. Roberts wrote,
“[w]e have repeatedly characterized . . . Spending Clause
legislation as ‘much in the nature of a contract.’” 165 But
almost immediately after this preliminary statement, the
Chief disregarded non-violent discourse and expressly
reverted back to a bellicose language plan: an attack has been
launched, a threat has been issued, battle lines have been
drawn, and the States must defend.
So who is it that the states are defending themselves
against? This may seem like a simple question to answer
given that the Medicaid expansion is a part of the federally
enacted ACA. The obvious answer, the federal government,
however, misses the point of the question. The question more
precisely is this: how does Roberts describe whom it is that
the states are defending themselves against? How does he
characterize the federal government in this situation? It
would be fair to say that the Chief’s opinion tells the story of
the States defending themselves against an attack by an
armed “thug” 166—a bully. Roberts referred to the Medicaid
expansion as a “weapon[] of coercion, destroying or impairing
the autonomy of the States,” 167 and then described the
financial inducement it offers to the States as “a gun to the
head” 168 wielded under the threat of “[y]our money or your
life.” 169 This is not the language one uses to frame a judicial
decision
about
the
proper
federal-state
policymaking/implementing relationship; this is the language one
uses in a police report to describe a “stick-up.” In this way,
what Roberts described corresponds to that moment in
164. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2601.
165. Id. at 2602 (quoting Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002)).
166. Id. at 2605 (“The threatened loss of over [ten] percent of a State’s overall
budget is economic dragooning . . . .”).
167. Id. at 2603 (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 586
(1937)).
168. Id. at 2604.
169. Id. at 2605 n.12.
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Derridean hospitality, when the violent, usurping behavior of
“Anyone who
the guest actually displaces the host. 170
encroaches on my ‘at home,’ on my ipseity, on my power of
hospitality, on my sovereignty as host, I start to regard as an
undesirable foreigner, and virtually as an enemy. This other
becomes a hostile subject, and I risk becoming their
hostage.” 171
It is the possibility of the states becoming hostage to the
federal Medicaid program that is driving Roberts to use
phrases like “gun to the head” and “your money or your life.”
He is responding to a federal posture that is, in his opinion,
coercive in the extreme. What is especially galling to Roberts
is that the federal government has for decades allowed the
states to incorporate Medicaid deeply into their own health
services and fiscal programs, effectively making the states
With that
dependent on Federal Medicaid funding. 172
dependency in place, Congress is now demanding that the
states expand their Medicaid services or lose all funding, a
consequence so devastating that it makes dissent nearimpossible. 173 “The threatened loss of over [ten] percent of a
State’s overall budget . . . is economic dragooning that leaves
the States with no real option but to acquiesce in the
Medicaid expansion.” 174 For Roberts, such strong-arm tactics
must be resisted.
The Chief’s opinion exemplifies two main features of the
sovereignty theory of federalism.
The first is that it
privileges state autonomy as a dominant federalism value.175
Second, it construes the general nature of the federal-state

170. Derrida tracks this inversion of the power relationship etymologically,
as the “host” becomes the object of “hostility” and is ultimately transformed into
a “hostage.” See DERRIDA, ON HOSPITALITY, supra note 31, at 53, 55.
171. Id.
172. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2605.
173. See id.
174. Id. The verb “dragoon” was coined in the aftermath of the English Civil
War and means “to subjugate or persecute by harsh use of troops” or “to force or
attempt to force into submission by violent measures.” MERRIAM-WEBSTERS
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 351 (10th ed. 1995).
175. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2592 (“[W]e have . . .
carried out our responsibility to declare unconstitutional those laws that
undermine the structure of government established by the Constitution. Such
laws . . . are, ‘in the words of The Federalist, merely acts of usurpation which
deserve to be treated as such.’ ” (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
924 (1997)).
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relationship as one grounded in competition where the states
are rivals and challengers to federal policymaking and viceversa. “In the typical case, we look to the States to defend
their prerogatives by adopting ‘the simple expedient of not
yielding’ to federal blandishments when they do not want to
embrace the federal policies as their own. The States are
Moreover,
separate and independent sovereigns.” 176
“Congress may not simply ‘conscript state [agencies] into the
national bureaucratic army.’” 177
Although the distinct spheres of federal versus state
sovereignty are not couched in terms of traditional subjects of
integral or exclusive state regulation (a framework which has
proved unworkable given its indeterminacy), 178 the Chief’s
opinion defends that wall separating “what is truly national
and what is truly local.” 179
2. Justice Ginsburg and the Cooperative Theory of
Federalism
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion, on the other hand, champions
the principles of cooperative federalism. 180 Underscoring her
analysis—both on the individual mandate and the Medicaid
expansion—is a conviction that the Framers of the
Constitution intended article I, section 8 to empower
Congress to address problems of collective action involving
multiple states. 181 Following the American Revolution, the
176. Id. at 2603 (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923)).
177. Id. at 2606–07 (quoting FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775 (1982)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
178. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
179. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000) (quoting United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995)).
180. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2609–42 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
181. Id. at 2615 (“The Commerce Clause, it is widely acknowledged, ‘was the
Framers’ response to the central problem that gave rise to the Constitution
itself.’ ” (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 245 n.1 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
concurring))). Under the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution’s precursor,
the regulation of commerce was left to the States. This scheme proved
unworkable, because the individual States, understandably focused on their
own economic interests, often failed to take actions critical to the success of the
Nation as a whole. See James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the
United States No. 5, in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 69, 71 (Jack N. Rakove ed.,
1999) (arguing that as a result of the “want of concert in matters where common
interest requires it,” the “national dignity, interest, and revenue [have]
suffered.”).

CISNEROS FINAL

54

4/26/2014 12:21 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

states acted individually, discriminating against commerce
coming from other states, when they needed to act
collectively. 182 The Articles of Confederation left Congress
powerless to solve these problems. 183 Thus emerged the
Constitution, establishing a federal government equipped to
address these collective action problems under its authority to
tax, borrow money, raise and support a military, and regulate
interstate commerce. 184 Against this background justification
for congressional authority, Justice Ginsburg analyzes the
scope of federal power as exercised in the ACA. 185
After reading through the Chief Justice’s opinion with its
recurrent use of battle language, where war and violence are
explicit, one might be under the impression that Justice
Ginsburg’s use of phrases like “retain[ing] a robust role for
. . . state governments,” 186 “empower[ing the] states,” 187
“offer[ing] States an opportunity,” 188 and “gave the States the
opportunity to partner” 189 render her opinion devoid of violent
themes. This, however, is not the case.
182. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2615 n.3 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part)
(“Alexander Hamilton described the problem this way: ‘[Often] it would be
beneficial to all the states to encourage, or suppress[,] a particular branch of
trade, while it would be detrimental . . . to attempt it without the concurrence of
the rest.’ ” (quoting Alexander Hamilton, The Continentalist No. V, in 3 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 75, 78 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962))).
183. See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN
THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 24–28, 47–48, 102–08, 167–68, 188–89
(1996) (discussing various failures of the Articles of Confederation).
184. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Apr. 8,
1787), in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 368, 370 (Robert A. Rutland & William
M. E. Rachal eds., 1975) (expressing the need for a “national Government . . .
armed with a positive [and] complete authority in all cases where uniform
measures are necessary.”); see also Letter from George Washington to James
Madison (Nov. 30, 1785), in 8 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 428, 429 (Robert A.
Rutland & William M. E. Rachal eds., 1973) (“We are either a United people, or
we are not. If the former, let us, in all matters of general concern act as a
nation, which ha[s] national objects to promote, and a national character to
support.”); see also Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seeling, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935)
(stating that the Constitution “was framed upon the theory that the peoples of
the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run
prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.”).
185. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2612 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (“States cannot
resolve the problem of the uninsured on their own.”).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 2632.
188. Id. at 2629.
189. Id. at 2633.
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Although Justice Ginsburg’s opinion is couched in less
obviously violent language, the principle theme of violence
persists in the structure of her argument. Her rationale
proceeds from the underlying premise that the states are
incompetent to respond in any meaningful way to the health
care issues the ACA addresses, and that this incompetence
renders the states displaceable:
States cannot resolve the problem of the uninsured on
their own. 190
The Framers’ solution was the Commerce Clause, which,
as they perceived it, granted Congress the authority to
enact economic legislation “in all Cases for the general
Interests of the Union, and also in those Cases to which
the States are separately incompetent.” 191
States that undertake health-care reforms on their own
thus risk “placing themselves in a position of economic
disadvantage as compared with neighbors or competitors
. . . .” 192 Congress’ intervention was needed to overcome
this collective-action impasse. 193
Far from trampling on States’ sovereignty, the ACA
attempts a federal solution for the very reason that the
States, acting separately cannot, meet the need. 194
[T]he minimum coverage provision, along with other
provisions of the ACA, addresses the very sort of
interstate problems that made the commerce power
essential in our federal system. The crisis created by the
large number of U.S. residents who lack health insurance
is one of national dimension that States are “separately
incompetent” to handle. 195

Based on this major premise of incompetency, Ginsburg’s
argument asserts the consequent minor premise that the
Court must privilege pragmatics over abstract generalities
when assessing the scope of Congress’s power, particularly
In other words,
regarding Commerce Clause power. 196
190. Id. at 2612.
191. Id. at 2615 (quoting 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
¶8, at 131–32 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)).
192. Id. at 2612 (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1937)).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 2628.
195. Id. (citation omitted).
196. Id. at 2616 (“Consistent with the Framers’ intent, we have repeatedly
emphasized that Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause is dependent
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practical considerations should trump arbitrary theoretical
restrictions: “We afford Congress the leeway ‘to undertake to
solve national problems directly and realistically.’” 197
With competence clearly establishing the authority for
and scope of federal power, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion goes on
to illustrate the federal-state relationship according to the
principles of cooperative federalism. It is a testament to how
engrained these federalism narratives are in our judicial and
political psyche, however, to note that even though Ginsburg’s
argument is grounded in the cooperative federalism
narrative, she still finds it necessary to engage, albeit briefly,
with the sovereignty narrative. 198
It is precisely because Ginsburg’s opinion establishes
from the outset the federal-state hierarchy, as well as state
subservience within that hierarchy, that one cannot easily see
the violence discourse underlying her analysis of the
Medicaid expansion. It is hidden in the subtlety of a
language-frame of state empowerment. Her opinion even
goes so far as to describe Medicaid as the classic example of
federal-state cooperation:
Medicaid is a prototypical example of federal-state
cooperation in serving the Nation’s general welfare.
Rather than authorizing a federal agency to administer a
uniform national health-care system for the poor,
Congress offered States the opportunity to tailor Medicaid
grants to their particular needs . . . . 199
[A]ny fair appraisal of Medicaid would require
acknowledgment of the considerable autonomy States
enjoy under the Act. 200
Subject to its basic requirements, the Medicaid Act
empowers the States to “select dramatically different
levels of funding and coverage, alter and experiment with
different financing and delivery modes, and opt to cover

upon ‘practical’ considerations, including ‘actual experience.’ ” (quoting NLRB.
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41–42 (1937))).
197. Id. (quoting Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 390 U.S. 90, 103 (1946)).
198. Id. at 2628 (“It is more than exaggeration to suggest that the minimum
coverage provision improperly intrudes on ‘essential attributes of state
sovereignty’ . . . . [T]he Affordable Care Act does not operate ‘in [an] are[a] such
as criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have been
sovereign.’ ” (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995))).
199. Id. at 2629.
200. Id. at 2632.
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(or not cover) a range of particular procedures and
therapies. States have leveraged this policy discretion to
generate a myriad of dramatically different Medicaid
programs over the past several decades.” 201

Despite the fact that Ginsburg’s opinion adopts an overt
discourse of state empowerment and opportunity, the
preceding statements actually perpetuate the underlying
discourse of violence associated with the federal-state
relationship by assuming the battle has already been fought,
and the states have lost. They are, in a word, conquered. It
is because the states have already been defeated that they
must assume the role of subjugated servant—the faithful
implementer of federal policies. Thus, for all of Ginsburg’s
talk about state autonomy and discretion, that autonomy and
discretion is confined to choices within the acceptable range
set forth by the federal program itself. For Ginsburg, modern
federalism works because there really is no more room for
plausible dissent. The states have not only been displaced as
hosts, as sovereigns, their status as servants is such that they
should feel grateful for what limited and local powers the
federal government allows them: “States have no entitlement
to receive Medicaid funds; they enjoy only the opportunity to
accept funds on Congress’ terms.” 202
Similarly, under the guise of declaring the importance of
the States’ role as partners, the opinion instead reinforces the
impotency of the States vis-à-vis the Congress:
Congress could have taken over the health-insurance
market. . . . Instead, of going this route, Congress enacted
the ACA, a solution that retains a robust role for private
insurers and state governments. 203
The alternative to conditional federal spending, it bears
emphasis,
is
not
state
autonomy
but
state
marginalization. In 1965, Congress elected to nationalize
health coverage for seniors through Medicare. It could
similarly have established Medicaid as an exclusively
federal program. Instead, Congress gave the States the
opportunity to partner with the program’s administration

201. Id. (quoting Theodore W. Ruger, Of Icebergs and Glaciers: The
Submerged Constitution of American Healthcare, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
215, 233 (2012) (footnote omitted)).
202. Id. at 2630 (emphasis added).
203. Id. at 2612.
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and development. Absent from the nationalized model, of
course, is the state-level policy discretion and
experimentation that is Medicaid’s hallmark; undoubtedly
the interests of federalism are better served when States
retain a meaningful role in the implementation of a
program of such importance. 204

The preceding statements contain a (not so) veiled threat:
“do as you are told or get left out altogether.” These
statements reflect the idea that the states serve only by the
generosity and at the pleasure of the federal government.
And at any moment, it can all be taken away. 205
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion represents the cooperative
theory of federalism grounded in three related ideas: (1) the
Constitution established a comprehensive federal government
endowed with the power to solve problems of collective action
affecting the states; (2) this power creates a hierarchical
federal-state relationship, which subordinates the states to
the will of the federal government; and (3) the states must
serve as faithful implementers of federal policies and
programs.
IV. HOSPITALITY PARADIGM SHIFTS FEDERALISM DISCOURSE
FROM VIOLENCE TO PRODUCTIVE GOVERNANCE
The drafting and ratification of the Constitution
represented a deliberate unification in which the States and
the newly formed Federal government had to relate to one
another in a novel power-sharing arrangement. 206 Derrida
discusses this idea of two distinct beings coming together in
one space as “hospitality.” Understanding Derrida’s notion of
hospitality creates an opportunity to unsettle the taken-forgranted relationship between host and guest in the context of
American-style federalism.
Hospitality is, in Derrida’s understanding, ultimately
about ethics. 207 Taken to the extreme, hospitality—the
opening up of one’s home to a stranger—is the fundamental
204. Id. at 2632–33 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
205. Id. at 2633 n.16 (“In 1972, for example, Congress ended the federal cashassistance program for the aged, blind, and disabled. That program previously
had been operated jointly by the Federal and State Governments, as is the case
with Medicaid today. Congress replaced the cooperative federal program with
the nationalized Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program.”).
206. See generally THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
207. See DERRIDA, OF HOSPITALITY, supra note 31, at 135, 137.
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act of ethics and of receptivity to the other. 208 As social
beings, the activity of welcoming and receiving others into our
space may be the most “human” thing we do. He terms this
ethical dimension of hospitality an “unconditional
hospitality”—a hospitality that makes no demand on the
other and welcomes the other without knowing in advance
who or what the other might be. 209 The ethos of hospitality,
at least in its absolute form, is dangerous and rather quickly
becomes untenable. 210 Because it implies a total welcome,
absolute—or unconditional—hospitality places the host in the
unenviable position of inviting the guest to displace him as
master of the house. 211 Once that happens, the host no longer
has anything to offer and he ceases to be a “host.” He
becomes the captive of his own ethic; he becomes a hostage.
Derrida does not exalt this ethic as some practical
objective to which all hosts should strive. On the contrary, he
recognizes that, as an ethic, unconditional hospitality, despite
the lovely “human-ness” of the initial invitation to the
stranger, is self-defeating and perhaps even fatal. 212 Instead,
Derrida tackles this dilemma inherent in unconditional
hospitality, by introducing the parallel concept of conditional
hospitality. 213 While unconditional hospitality represents the
ethical dimension of hospitality, conditional hospitality
represents its political dimension: the right to welcome and
be welcomed according to agreed-upon limits and obligations.
This political dimension involves judicial principles and
institutional arrangements.
The two understandings of
hospitality correspond to the tension between ethics and
politics in the current dominant federalism discourse, which
can be formulated as two contradictory but (at least to their
advocates) equally justified imperatives.
Just as the two notions of hospitality—the ethical
absolute version and the political rule-governed version—
must coexist, so too must the principles that underlie the
theories of sovereignty federalism and cooperative federalism.

208. See id.
209. Id. at 135.
210. See id. at 25, 27.
211. Id. at 125; see also Mark W. Westmoreland, Interruptions: Derrida and
Hospitality, 2 KRITIKE 1, 6 (2008).
212. See DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL, supra note 37, at 111.
213. Jacques Derrida, The Principle of Hospitality, 11 PARRALLAX 6–9 (2005).
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It is between these two that decisions must be made. Derrida
refers to this search for a middle path as the quest for
“intermediate schema.” 214
While current federalism
arguments require one to be chosen over the other, hospitality
shows us that the two forms are always present. The ethics
and politics of hospitality do not exclude one another. To the
contrary, each needs the other to exist; they are
metaphysically and practically symbiotic. Thus, it should not
be that we select one over the other; rather, we should
acknowledge the need for the two approaches to relate more
to each other.
In the federalism context, conditional
hospitality corresponds to a respect for institutional
sovereignty subject to regulative forces, while unconditional
hospitality corresponds to the welcoming based on a feeling of
responsibility for others.
A. Defects of Dominant Federalism Theory Paradigms
The dominant federalism theory paradigms are defective,
at least to the extent they are viewed as exclusive and
complete.
When claims of sovereignty federalism and
cooperative federalism are mired in violence, they no longer
provide an adequate construct to meaningfully debate
federal-state regulatory authority. Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Ginsburg’s opinions in Sebelius exemplify the extent
to which violence continues to dominate the discourse that
governs the relationship between the Federal Government
and the States. The Court’s homage to traditional federalism
values is incomplete because it places the States and the
Federal Government in a relationship, which, by its very
structure, is adversarial. It suggests that power is a zero-sum
game played by the host (the States) and the guest (the
Federal Government) from the moment of initial contact; and
whatever the former cedes to the latter tends necessarily to
make the latter stronger and more insatiable. But like most
antinomic relationships, this one is false, or at least capable
of being upended, despite its claim to primacy and
permanence. As Theodore Ruger pointed out in an article
published just after the ACA opinion came down, “the ACA
litigation’s suggestion of an oppositional or mutually

214. DERRIDA, OF HOSPITALITY, supra note 31, at 147.
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exclusive federalism is misleading.” 215
The Court’s articulation of federalism is also
unproductive.
In Beyond Separation in Federalism
Enforcement: Medicaid Expansion, Coercion, and the Norm of
Engagement, Professor Charlton Copeland points to the role
separation of the States and the Federal Government plays in
current federalism discourse. 216 He claims that the current
dominance of separation as the underlying component
safeguarding breaches of federalism should be replaced by
endowing subsequent implementation of federal policy with
significance. 217 He argues that this turn from separation to
engagement will provide a more effective basis for judging the
balance of power (and level of coercion, if any) in the federalstate relationship. 218
To illustrate his point, Professor Copeland critiques the
Chief Justice and Justice Ginsburg’s use of the clear
The clear
statement rule in their coercion analysis. 219
statement principle has been identified as one of the most
important of the Dole factors in spending clause analysis
because it requires that state knowledge and voluntary
acceptance of conditions to federal funding can only exist
when the terms of the conditions are explicit and
unambiguous. 220
Professor Copeland condemns both Roberts and
Ginsburg’s Spending Clause analysis, for having “collapsed
the clear statement requirement into their discussion of the

215. Theodore W. Ruger, Of Icebergs and Glaciers: The Submerged
Constitution of American Healthcare, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 224
(2012).
216. See Charlton Copeland, Beyond Separation in Federalism Enforcement:
Medicaid Expansion, Coercion and the Norm of Engagement, 15 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 91, 91 (2012) (arguing that the focus of current federalism discourse
on separation defined at a singular point in time between the federal and state
governments to determine coercion does not appropriately account for the
significant level of engagement between the two governing systems needed to
successfully enforce, protect, and advance cooperative governance).
217. Id. at 100.
218. Id. at 100–01.
219. Id. at 158.
220. See, e.g., David E. Engdahl, The Contract Thesis of the Federal Spending
Power, 52 S.D. L. REV. 496, 496 (2007) (arguing that the clear statement rule
reinforces the contract metaphor of the federal-state relationship, which relies
on explicitly stated terms as an effective exercise of state voluntariness and
sovereignty).
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coercion claim.” 221 He claims that their reliance on the clear
statement rule to analyze coercion in federal-state Medicaid
relationship misses the point. 222 Instead of looking at the
totality of the federal-state Medicaid relationship for coercion,
both Roberts and Ginsburg relied on a simplistic analysis of
notice to determine the nature of the relationship. 223 While
focusing on different temporal aspects of the relationship as
significant, both opinions remained mired in the dominance of
separation as the vital component for exercises of state
sovereignty and federalism protection. 224
In addition to their focus on the clear statement
principle, the Chief Justice and Justice Ginsburg’s treatment
of the Medicaid program’s inception in 1965 illustrates how
focus on a temporal point in a relationship informs one’s
recognition of violence. Roberts points to the investment that
states have made over the last 47 years in developing
“intricate statutory and administrative regimes over the
course of many decades to implement their objectives under
existing Medicaid.” 225 In doing so, he suggests that the
manner in which the federal-state relationship develops over
the life of a federal program is a significant (if not
determining factor) in establishing the respective rights and
obligations under that program. But then Roberts veers.
Rather than finish his argument that context should inform
whether a proposed change in a federal program is unduly
coercive he changes tack and concludes that the Medicaid
expansion is coercive because it constitutes an entirely new
program. 226 This decision to bifurcate the expansion from the
original program creates a new battlefield on which the states
and federal government can wage war. A war that the Chief
Justice concludes the states should win.
Justice Ginsburg’s treatment of the subsequent
implementation of the Medicaid program fares little better.
While acknowledging that the Medicaid program has
undergone significant changes over time, 227 Justice Ginsburg
221. Copeland, supra note 216, at 158.
222. See id.
223. Id.
224. See id. at 158–61.
225. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012).
226. Id. at 2605–06.
227. See id. at 2631 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
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denies that any of those subsequent changes affect the nature
of the relationship between the federal and state governments
for purposes of determining coercion. 228 Instead, Ginsburg
defends the Medicaid expansion provision’s constitutionality
in terms of whether notice of authority to change the program
was given at the beginning of the federal-state Medicaid
relationship. 229 Given that the original 1965 act provided
notice to the states that Congress had the authority to change
the program from time to time, Justice Ginsburg concluded
the expansion provision was not coercive. 230
Justice
Ginsburg’s analysis seeks to identify merely whether the
technical requirements of notice have been met. It limits the
jurisprudential understanding of notice to the singular
moment when the federal-state relationship as to a particular
federal program begins. For Ginsburg, the bargaining table
instantiates the entire relationship between the parties for all
time.
Each side must negotiate all aspects of the
relationship, known and unknown, over the life of the
relationship at the initial enacting moment, i.e., a battle once
fought and lost cannot be refought.
While Roberts’ opinion framed the federal-state
relationship as a series of battles, each presenting a new
opportunity for victory and defeat, and Ginsburg framed it as
one battle fought long ago forever cementing the federal-state
relationship, recent scholarship has emphasized a more
nuanced approach to the dominance of separation in
federalism discourse. 231 Much of this scholarship stresses the
ability of states to influence federal policies through
mechanisms of resistance. For example, in Uncooperative
Federalism, Professors Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather
Gerken argue that states in the role of servant can exercise
power against the federal government via dissent to federal
228. Id. at 2633–34 (stating, “Congress’s authority to condition the use of
federal funds is not confined to spending programs as first launched. The
legislature may, and often does, amend the law, imposing new conditions grant
recipients henceforth must meet in order to continue receiving funds.”).
229. See id. at 2638.
230. Id.
231. See, e.g., JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES
PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING (2009); Jessica
Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J.
1256 (2009); Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2011);
Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of State-based
Dissent to Federal Health Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111 (2011).
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policy. 232 The authors argue that state dissent, in various
forms such as opting-out of federal programs, litigation to
challenge federal policy as unconstitutional, and enacting
conflicting state legislation, can in some instances compel the
federal government to be more open to state concerns and
desires, thus stimulating a more productive dialogue between
the federal and state governments. 233 According to these
scholars, this dialogue enables states to play a role in federal
policymaking. 234
Similarly, in Rhetorical Federalism, Professor Elizabeth
Weeks Leonard argues that a larger, more radical menu of
state-driven dissent may be necessary to effect a positive
She describes “rhetorical
change in federal policy. 235
federalism” as “state-centered dissent to federal programs in
the form of refusing to implement new federal legislation,
challenging the constitutionality of federal laws, resisting
federal mandates, ignoring federal precedent, and even
threatening to secede from the Union.” 236 Professor Leonard
explains, “like uncooperative federalism, rhetorical federalism
finds value in states not simply falling in line with federal
authorities”. 237 She concludes that state-centered dissent,
whether based on concerns about structural allocation of
power or opportunistic desire for political benefit, is valuable
to federal policymaking and federal-state relationships
because it: (1) brings transparency to the task of
implementing comprehensive laws, (2) educates the electorate
by distilling the law to discrete issues, (3) gives voice to
minority views, (4) depoliticizes highly charged issues, (5)
codifies dissent, and (6) highlights the increased role of
government in health care delivery. 238
These approaches are acutely insightful. They offer
viable options for states to participate more fully in the
federal policy making process by suggesting ways states can
exploit their subordinate posture.
Nevertheless, these
232. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 231, at 1262.
233. See id. at 1271–80.
234. See id. at 1263, 1265.
235. See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of
State-based Dissent to Federal Health Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111, 112–13
(2011).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 162.
238. Id. at 162–67.
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arguments about the empowerment of state-based resistance
remain grounded in the violence discourse that frames our
dominant federalism theories: a discourse that I have argued
truncates meaningful development of a federal-state
partnership. Although state-centered dissent reconceives the
states’ options for participation, it does so within the same
constraints of the master/servant paradigm. Instead of
displacing this paradigm, state-centered dissent emphasizes
the hierarchy by limiting state action to the contrarian power
of the servant, the power merely to say “no.” This limitation
reifies the inherited ideal of violence as the operating norm
for establishing and developing federal-state relations. This
is, however, a better alternative.
B. From Unconditional to a Conditional Welcome
The hospitality paradigm offers the opportunity to
transcend the impasse of the current federalism debate by
providing a balance between the two dominant theories. As is
indicated by Chief Justice Roberts’ ACA opinion, too much
emphasis on the structural justifications of the sovereignty
theory will tip the balance too far in favor of the states. As
Justice Ginsburg’s ACA opinion indicates, too much emphasis
on the political justifications of cooperative federalism will tip
the balance too far in favor of the federal government. Each
approach is skewed and continually reinforces the operation
of violence within the federal-state relationship. Although
hospitality acknowledges violence, it goes beyond that
violence to consider balanced cooperation through mutuallyagreed upon conditions.
Hospitality reconciles these
divergent theories of federalism by requiring respect for
sovereignty while recognizing the significance of the actual
federal-state relationship developed through implementation
of government regulatory programs. Thus, the hospitality
norm is capable of reorienting the debate about federalism.
Hospitality is often taken for granted as something we do
to be kind to others. However, as discussed in this article, it
is an ambiguous notion full of contradictions. Derrida
demonstrates how the head of the house, to offer hospitality
and welcome a stranger through the door, must maintain
control and ownership of the home—i.e., sovereignty. It
requires the right to a particular place and it involves power
and inequality in the relation between the host and the

CISNEROS FINAL

66

4/26/2014 12:21 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

guest—the very things that are anathema to pure, absolute,
ethical hospitality. Even if the initial welcome is framed as
unconditional, Derrida shows how welcoming someone into
your home can challenge your sovereignty over that place and
the feeling of being sidelined as the host can change your
attitude toward the guest. Being a host implies a temporary
relationship and when the guest does not leave, the attitude
towards the guest tends to change. This feeling of losing
control over one’s home makes it necessary to reassert
control. For Derrida, this double imperative of hospitality
means that the relationship with the other takes place in the
tension between conditional and unconditional hospitality.
The Derridean principle of hospitality exposes the
weakness of much of the current dominant federalism
discourse and offers an alternative. Violence does not have to
be the primary frame for federalism discourse. Derrida’s
principles of hospitality provide a framework through which
to conceive a discourse of Federalism that accounts for but is
not dominated by violence.
Absolute/unconditional
hospitality accounts for violence by acknowledging that the
guest may overtake the host because the host cannot set
limits. In this sense, achieving unconditional hospitality is
impossible because hospitality requires the host to retain
sovereignty. Conditional hospitality, however, occurs in the
pursuit of this “impossibility.” Conditional hospitality is
achieved by allowing the host to set limits on the guest,
thereby retaining sovereignty, yet allowing for mutually
beneficial interaction between host and guest. In a very real
sense, power allocation becomes reciprocal from the very
beginning of the discourse.
Similarly, while either theory of federalism in the
absolute would destroy federalism because it would require
either the federal government or the states to relinquish their
sovereignty, conditional federalism would account for
violence, but displace it from its primary status. This
displacement, which acknowledges violence only in a
secondary sense, would instead privilege the political
relationship and power allocations indicated by the provisions
of the federal programs themselves.
The political
relationships and power allocations could be construed using
the host/guest discourse. The host/guest language-frame
allows for acceptance of entry, retention of sovereignty, and
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the right to establish (negotiate) conditions on access. The
host/guest language frame enables federalism analysis to
take place within a dialogue of shared partnership rather
than one of subjugation and violence.
CONCLUSION
Thinking of federalism as a form of “hospitality” requires
that states become active participants in the federal
policymaking process.
From Derrida’s discussions of
hospitality we can learn that hospitality engagements should
take place as a double imperative of unconditionality and
conditionality.
Allowing for the negotiations between
conditional and unconditional hospitality, and for both
understandings of sovereignty and collective action problems
to prevail requires opening up the different approaches to
federalism analysis. Conflicts between federal and state
regulatory authority are unlikely to abate. The traditional
federalism discourse is no longer adequate to sustain a debate
about the operation of the federal-state relationship. The
hospitality paradigm has the potential to unsettle the
inherited understanding of that relationship and reorient our
conception of federalism in a way that is meaningful to
assessing government regulation addressing twenty-first
century problems.

